NFL Coaches Are More Gutless Than Ever on Fourth Down

By Scott Kacsmar

Cold Hard Football Facts’ Comeback King (@CaptainComeback)

Last season Atlanta coach Mike Smith was criticized for a 4th-and-1 decision to go for it in overtime at his own 29 against the Saints. Michael Turner was stuffed short, and New Orleans kicked the game-winning field goal four plays later.

In Week 10 this past Sunday, the Falcons faced a 4th-and-goal at the NO 2, trailing the Saints 28-24 with 9:12 left. With an undefeated season at stake against a historically bad defense, there was no debating the decision this time. Smith quickly had his team kick the field goal, and would fall short in the game, 31-27, in a rare failed comeback attempt for Matt Ryan’s offense.

Smith’s Falcons are the only team in the league in 2012 without a fourth-down conversion, and they are tied for the fewest attempts (three).

Was the field-goal decision a case of Smith knowing the numbers, or is it just another example of a logic-defying coach showing no guts as they hope to avoid the harsh criticism if the play fails?

This is hardly just a Mike Smith problem. This is a league-wide epidemic of sissified coaching in an era where the fourth-down data has never been clearer or more available to teams.

Yet we are seeing the least aggressive coaching on fourth down in over twenty years. Isn’t this supposed to be the era of offense? Instead coaches would rather just punt or kick field goals, even though the conversion rates are as high as ever too.

You might think the recent influx of new head coaches could be the reason for this decline. The guys without clout not wanting to earn a bad reputation early are bringing down the numbers.

But even a maverick like Bill Belichick is only 1-of-3 on fourth down this season after New England went 7-of-11 last season.

Coaches can talk all they want about playing off a card or going with their gut, but we have the facts, and the facts say they are just too gutless as a group, and it might only be getting worse.

 

League-wide data (1991-2012)

You can get fourth-down team stats going back to 1991 from the NFL’s official website. We compiled that data, which only includes regular season games. The “Scrm Plays” are the total number of plays from scrimmage.

NFL - 4th Down Conversion Attempts, 1991-2012
Year	Scrm Plays	4th Made	4th Att.	Conv. %	4DPlay %
1991	27,221	193	410	47.07%	1.51%
1992	26,839	177	399	44.36%	1.49%
1993	28,153	184	406	45.32%	1.44%
1994	28,543	223	461	48.37%	1.62%
1995	30,974	267	496	53.83%	1.60%
1996	30,666	234	464	50.43%	1.51%
1997	30,621	240	495	48.48%	1.62%
1998	30,264	200	454	44.05%	1.50%
1999	31,557	206	473	43.55%	1.50%
2000	31,231	218	455	47.91%	1.46%
2001	31,043	203	468	43.38%	1.51%
2002	32,569	252	497	50.70%	1.53%
2003	32,093	232	501	46.31%	1.56%
2004	31,978	219	454	48.24%	1.42%
2005	32,021	223	465	47.96%	1.45%
2006	32,000	239	473	50.53%	1.48%
2007	32,133	261	533	48.97%	1.66%
2008	31,681	260	491	52.95%	1.55%
2009	32,222	279	557	50.09%	1.73%
2010	32,319	238	484	49.17%	1.50%
2011	32,569	186	430	43.26%	1.32%
2012	18,873	132	240	55.00%	1.27%
TOT	667,570	4,866	10,106	48.15%	1.51%

Teams convert just under half (48.15 percent) of their fourth-down attempts, though so far in 2012, it is as high as it has ever been (55.0 percent). This comes a year after the worst conversion rate on fourth down since 1991 (43.26 percent in 2011).

The “4DPlay %” is the percentage of plays from scrimmage that are fourth-down attempts. It is a very small number, and you can see the average is 1.51 percent. But the two lowest seasons since 1991 are each of the last two seasons: 1.32 percent in 2011 and 1.27 percent in 2012. No other season is under 1.42 percent.

Think you know which team has gone for it on fourth down the most? Yes, it is New England, but not the Bill Belichick teams. Instead it was the 1994-96 Patriots with Bill Parcells and Drew Bledsoe leading the way for the top three spots: 1995 Patriots (17/39), 1994 Patriots (18/35), and 1996 Patriots (19/34).

The 1996 Chicago Bears, a 7-9 team coached by Dave Wannstedt, had the most conversions, with 20 out of 28. Yeah, we have no clue how that happened either.

How about the fewest attempts excluding 2012? That would be two teams who met in the NFC Championship: the 1998 Atlanta Falcons (1/3) and Minnesota Vikings (3/3). Two great offenses, they did not roll the dice much.

Of course to roll the dice, you have to be put in a fourth-down opportunity in the first place.

We know from a past study, that third-down rates have been dropping in recent years as well. A fourth down can only come after an unsuccessful third-down attempt.

Let’s break down the fourth-down percentage based on number of fourth-down attempts per failed third-down plays. This gives us a better idea of how often a coach goes for it when faced with a fourth-down opportunity. Plays at the end of the half on third down that do not result in a fourth-down play being run would change the data, but we did not account for those as there’s no reason to believe they have become more or less common.

4th Down Attempt Percentage
Year	Failed 3rd Downs	4D Pct.
1991	3516	11.66%
1992	3584	11.13%
1993	3676	11.04%
1994	3739	12.33%
1995	3917	12.66%
1996	4045	11.47%
1997	4173	11.86%
1998	4091	11.10%
1999	4339	10.90%
2000	4111	11.07%
2001	4183	11.19%
2002	4205	11.82%
2003	4305	11.64%
2004	4185	10.85%
2005	4248	10.95%
2006	4218	11.21%
2007	4152	12.84%
2008	4082	12.03%
2009	4223	13.19%
2010	4224	11.46%
2011	4207	10.22%
2012	2387	10.05%
TOT	87810	11.51%

Generally, a team only goes for it on offense on 11.51 percent of the fourth-down opportunities that come up in a game.

There was a recent surge from 2007-2009 on teams going for it a little more often, but that has now fallen to the lowest rate ever the last two seasons, with the lowest this season (10.05 percent).

Even though offenses have been historically great at converting on fourth down this season, coaches are using it to their advantage at the lowest documented rate we can find.

 

Rising trend in risk-averse coaching

If something is working so well, why not use it more? The problem is most coaches are strongly risk averse, and a big part of that is the way a coach is attacked by the mainstream media when a decision does not work.

We talked about Mike Smith, but even Bill Belichick felt the brunt of it for his 4th-and-2 decision in a national prime time game against the Colts in 2009.

If even Belichick cannot get away with the scorn for that one, how can any of these other coaches?

The sad thing is the numbers still support many of these decisions, but the coaches will continue to ignore them because they do not want to be criticized for trying to win the game. Imagine that. Criticized for trying to win a game.

Notice how it is usually the fans that call for the coach to go for it on fourth down more often. But this may be a case where the fans are right for a change.

Using the Game Play Finder at Pro-Football-Reference, we were able to compile a lot more data on fourth-down conversions from 2000 to 2012 (regular season only and through Week 10 this season).

Here is a breakdown of the fourth-down attempts by an offense from 2000 to 2010 based on when the attempt occurred (quarter and if the team was trailing, tied or leading).

Distribution of 4th Down Plays From Scrimmage (2000-2010)
Quarter	Trailing	4DP%	Tied	4DP%	Leading	4DP%	Total	4DP%
1st	186	3.5%	360	6.7%	89	1.7%	635	11.8%
2nd	483	9.0%	109	2.0%	311	5.8%	903	16.8%
3rd	529	9.8%	47	0.9%	288	5.3%	864	16.0%
4th/OT	2441	45.3%	52	1.0%	495	9.2%	2988	55.4%
Total	3639	67.5%	568	10.5%	1183	21.9%	By Quarter

Not surprisingly, 45.3 percent of the fourth-down attempts come from a team trailing in the fourth quarter. The fourth quarter (and overtime) alone accounts for 55.4 percent of all the fourth-down attempts.

When the game is tied, teams are most likely to go for it in the first quarter, but get away from doing that the rest of the game.

Another sign of avoiding risk is the low (1.7 percent) mark of fourth-down tries when leading in the first quarter. A coach may feel comfortable with his early lead and does not want to get “greedy” to try to build on it.

One category that needs some data cleaning is leading in the fourth quarter/overtime (9.2 percent), because a lot of kneel downs and irrelevant plays are inflating that total.

Here is the same comparison, but only for the 2011-2012 seasons.

Distribution of 4th Down Plays From Scrimmage (2011-2012)
Quarter	Trailing	4DP%	Tied	4DP%	Leading	4DP%	Total	4DP%
1st	12	1.8%	38	5.7%	13	1.9%	63	9.4%
2nd	58	8.7%	10	1.5%	39	5.8%	107	16.0%
3rd	47	7.0%	4	0.6%	24	3.6%	75	11.2%
4th/OT	352	52.5%	6	0.9%	67	10.0%	425	63.4%
Total	469	70.0%	58	8.7%	143	21.3%	By Quarter

Look at the big change. Now we have teams attempting 52.5 percent of all fourth downs in the fourth quarter when trailing, and 63.4 percent overall attempts coming in the fourth quarter/OT.

We also see a decrease in attempts while tied and in the first and third quarters as well.

In other words, teams since last season are going for fourth down in the most obvious of situations even more, and doing it less often in the riskier moments of the game.

 

The most common fourth-down decision

While most people are not asking for a coach to go for it on 4th and 10 inside their own territory, everyone can agree that there needs to be more attempts on 4th and short, and especially on 4th and 1.

Since 2000, roughly 89.4 percent of all fourth-down attempts come on 4th and 1.

It is the easiest and most common call to make for a fourth down, so let’s break those numbers down. The “GO%” is the percentage of 4th-and-1’s in which the team did make an attempt with their offense. The “Rate” in the last column is their conversion rate. We removed muffed or fumbled punts from the conversions as they come up under Pro-Football-Reference’s searches as first downs.

4th-and-1's		Decision				Success Rate
Year	4th-1	Run	Pass	Punt	FG	GO%	Conv.	Rate
2000	408	118	37	171	82	37.99%	105	67.74%
2001	432	130	40	194	68	39.35%	92	54.12%
2002	424	136	40	179	69	41.51%	121	68.75%
2003	424	146	36	179	63	42.92%	125	68.68%
2004	422	123	36	202	61	37.68%	107	67.30%
2005	431	153	42	186	50	45.24%	125	64.10%
2006	432	128	40	184	80	38.89%	115	68.45%
2007	445	164	46	164	71	47.19%	132	62.86%
2008	435	161	45	177	52	47.36%	142	68.93%
2009	485	171	59	196	59	47.42%	152	66.09%
2010	429	143	46	176	64	44.06%	123	65.08%
2011	397	109	35	190	63	36.27%	77	53.47%
2012	252	63	25	127	37	34.92%	63	71.59%
TOT	5416	1745	527	2325	819	41.95%	1479	65.10%

When faced with a 4th and 1, teams are going for it just under 42.0 percent of the time, and converting 65.1 percent of the time. That includes a very high 71.6 conversion rate this season.

But once again, we see 2012 with the highest conversion rate, but the lowest attempt rate (34.92 percent). One has to wonder if part of the reason is that 2011 had the poorest conversion rate (53.47 percent), so these coaches are nervous to go for it.

But that did not stop the coaches in 2002 after a poor conversion rate of 54.12 percent in 2001. They increased their attempt rate to 41.51 percent. Things once again were starting to peak from 2007-2009 with coaches going for it over 47.1 percent of the time each season.

Now we are back to being ultra conservative the last two years. This does not fit the “offense rules” story one bit.

Here are the 4th-and-1 numbers broken down for attempts inside opponent territory (inside and including the 50). Obviously a coach is more likely to go for that 4th and 1 on that side of the field.

In Opponent's Territory (>50)
4th-and-1's		Decision				Success Rate
Year	4th-1	Run	Pass	Punt	FG	GO%	Conv.	Rate
2000	246	95	33	36	82	52.03%	90	70.31%
2001	246	113	37	28	68	60.98%	81	54.00%
2002	234	107	36	22	69	61.11%	96	67.13%
2003	241	127	25	26	63	63.07%	106	69.74%
2004	232	104	30	37	61	57.76%	90	67.16%
2005	238	131	33	24	50	68.91%	105	64.02%
2006	249	105	34	30	80	55.82%	95	68.35%
2007	272	139	39	23	71	65.44%	110	61.80%
2008	246	137	35	22	52	69.92%	121	70.35%
2009	285	142	50	34	59	67.37%	126	65.63%
2010	255	121	40	30	64	63.14%	102	63.35%
2011	202	88	31	20	63	58.91%	59	49.58%
2012	130	51	20	22	37	54.62%	50	70.42%
TOT	3076	1460	443	354	819	61.87%	1231	64.69%

Or is he? Of all the 4th-and-1 attempts since 2000, 56.8 percent have been attempted inside opponent territory compared to 43.2 percent inside your own territory. Perhaps not the split we expected, though within your own territory you get more of the trick plays.

• In opponent territory, teams go for it on fourth down 61.87 percent of the time, and convert 64.69 percent.
• Inside their own territory, teams go for it on fourth down 15.77 percent of the time, and convert 67.21 percent.

Once again, in 2012 we see teams only going for it 54.62 percent of the time on 4th and 1 in opponent territory, despite the fact they are converting a 21st-century-best 70.42 percent of the time. And once again, that follows a horrific rate last season of just 49.58 percent.

If teams convert just as well, if not better, inside their own territory on 4th and 1, why not go for it more often? But of course, that involves a lot more risk, and we know coaches hate risk, and they apparently hate it more than ever.

• From 2000 to 2010, coaches went for it on 4th and 1 inside their own territory 16.16 percent of the time, and converted 66.36 percent.
• Since 2011, coaches have gone for it on 4th and 1 inside their own territory 13.25 percent of the time, and converted 73.81 percent.

Even though teams are 31 of 42 – really should be 31 of 40 (77.5 percent) when you exclude kneel downs by Matt Ryan and Drew Brees – at converting 4th and 1 inside their own territory the last two years, we are seeing it happen less often.

Going back and removing all kneel downs or intentional safeties at the end of the game on fourth down would only enhance the conversion rate, which tells us teams should be going for it on fourth down more often.

 

Conclusion

For as much praise is heaped on the offenses in today’s NFL, coaches are more than ever limiting their chances for success by not allowing them to stay on the field, even in the most common situations (4th and 1).

Every move is analyzed with great scrutiny in today’s game, but coaches should believe in the fourth-down data and what that tells them more than they should care what some writer says retroactively about their decision in overtime.

These are risks, but they are calculated risks. The numbers are predictive, though you should apply them to your team’s strengths. If Peyton Manning (league-best numbers on fourth down since 2000) is your quarterback, you may want to put the ball in his hands compared to Willis McGahee. If you are the Minnesota Vikings, Adrian Peterson is a better option than Christian Ponder.

But regardless of your offensive philosophy, if you cannot trust your team to gain one yard when they need it most, then what does that say about you and your team? What are you saying to your team by punting?

At this pace we will finish 2012 with the best conversion rates on all fourth down and 4th-and-1 attempts since 1991, but with the fewest decisions.

Instead of embracing the data, NFL coaches continue to move further away from logic and deeper into conservatism, afraid to take accountability for their actions.

To modify an old quote, “it is better to lose on your feet than win on your knees.”

When will that next maverick coach come around, taking what Herm Edwards said to heart, but applying his brain and actually following through with the plan that will win games?

Right now, the NFL is lacking in fortitude. When fear is the driving factor in your decision to punt, you might have picked the wrong profession. The only good news is you are no different than your colleagues.

Gutless.

 

Scott Kacsmar is a football writer/researcher who has contributed large quantities of data to Pro-Football-Reference.com, including the only standardized database of fourth quarter comebacks and game-winning drives. You can visit his blog for a complete writing archive. Please send any questions or comments to Scott at smk_42@yahoo.com, or you can follow him on Twitter at @CaptainComeback.

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