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Dallas's doomsday scenario
Cold, Hard Football Facts for September 10, 2010
 By Luis DeLoureiroCold, Hard Football Facts Husband of the Year
The Cold, Hard Football Facts make no secret of their admiration for Tony Romo.
Not only did he quit uber-country-hottie Carrie Underwood cold turkey while we still sleep with her photo under our pillow, he's also a statistical juggernaut. He enters the 2010 season No. 3 in career passer rating (95.6) and No. 4 in passing yards per attempt – his 8.10 YPA the best by any quarterback who's taken a snap over the past 50 years.
The numbers suggest that Romo is an elite NFL quarterback. Yet the onfield results say otherwise: each of the past three seasons have ended with punchless playoff losses: last season it was an inept 34-3 defeat at Minnesota in the divisional playoffs.
So what gives? Despite a full-time job, two children who look like the plumber and a needy wife who's threatening to leave if I black out at one more wedding, we decided to decipher Dallas's doomsday scenario rather than tend to our domestic responsibilities.
It turns out, of course, that the answer is found in our Quality Stats: in this case in our Scoreability Index, CHFF's measure of offensive efficiency.
For those who don't remember, the Scoreability Index is not merely an offensive indicator. It is, instead, a team-wide measure of ability to turn yards into points. It takes into account a variety of factors (including proficiency of defense and special teams, red zone offense, and turnover differential) and then spits it all out in an easy-to-understand number.
The calculation is so simple even you can do it: Offensive Yards/Total Points Scored = Yards Per Point Scored (YPPS). The lower the number the more efficiently a team scores points.
The Cowboys were a disaster in this indicator in 2009. Romo & Co. finished second in total offense, but just 14th in scoring offense. As a result, Dallas was among the worst in the NFL in Scoreability: No. 25 to be exact, sandwiched between the terrible Browns and Seahawks.
Here's a look at the Final 2009 Scoreability Index, with Top 10 teams in total offense identified in the far right column.
Final 2009 Scoreability Index
|
Team |
Yards |
Points |
YPPS |
Top 10 Total Offense |
|
New Orleans |
6,461 |
510 |
12.67 |
X |
|
San Diego |
5,761 |
454 |
12.69 |
X |
|
Minnesota |
6,074 |
470 |
12.92 |
X |
|
Green Bay |
6,065 |
461 |
13.16 |
X |
|
Philadelphia |
5,726 |
429 |
13.35 |
|
|
Indianapolis |
5,809 |
416 |
13.96 |
X |
|
San Francisco |
4,652 |
330 |
14.10 |
|
|
Baltimore |
5,619 |
391 |
14.37 |
|
|
N.Y. Giants |
5,856 |
402 |
14.57 |
X |
|
Arizona |
5,510 |
375 |
14.69 |
|
|
N.Y. Jets |
5,136 |
348 |
14.76 |
|
|
New England |
6,357 |
427 |
14.89 |
X |
|
Miami |
5,401 |
360 |
15.00 |
|
|
Atlanta |
5,447 |
363 |
15.01 |
|
|
Chicago |
4,965 |
327 |
15.18 |
|
|
Houston |
6,125 |
388 |
15.79 |
X |
|
Tennessee |
5,623 |
354 |
15.88 |
|
|
Pittsburgh |
5,938 |
368 |
16.14 |
X |
|
Cincinnati |
4,946 |
305 |
16.22 |
|
|
Kansas City |
4,832 |
294 |
16.44 |
|
|
Denver |
5,463 |
326 |
16.76 |
|
|
Carolina |
5,297 |
315 |
16.82 |
|
|
Buffalo |
4,382 |
258 |
16.98 |
|
|
Cleveland |
4,163 |
245 |
16.99 |
|
|
Dallas |
6,390 |
361 |
17.70 |
X |
|
Seattle |
5,069 |
280 |
18.10 |
|
|
Detroit |
4,784 |
262 |
18.26 |
|
|
Jacksonville |
5,389 |
290 |
18.58 |
|
|
Washington |
5,008 |
266 |
18.83 |
|
|
Tampa Bay |
4,601 |
244 |
18.86 |
|
|
Oakland |
4,258 |
197 |
21.61 |
|
|
St. Louis |
4,470 |
175 |
25.54 |
|
So that's the big picture. But when we dive into the numbers when we should be feeding the family, we find two major problems contributed to Dallas's Doomsday scenario: red zone offense and turnovers
Red Zone Offense
Here's a graph showing how often teams reached the red zone last year and, once there, the average number of points they scored.
For the most part, playoff teams reached the red zone more often than non-playoff teams. And, once they got there, they scored more points. No surprises there.
The Cowboys jump out because they were middle of the pack in both appearances in the red zone and in red zone scoring. And among playoff teams, the Cowboys were second to last in each metric.
Only the offensively challenged Jets, with rookie QB Mark Sanchez, ranked below Dallas in red zone appearances. But even the Jets averaged 4.5 points per red zone appearance – compared to the Cowboys' 4.39 points per red zone appearance.
The Ravens were the only playoff team with fewer points per red zone visit. But, even then, the Ravens were high on the list of drives that resulted in red zone appearances.
The kicking game didn't help Dallas, either. Nick Folk connected on just 18 for 28 (64%) of his field goals in 2009, a dreadful rate in the modern game.
Turnovers
Turnovers were the other big problem for the Cowboys.
Below is a graph showing turnovers vs. Scoreability. (In case you wonder why women avoid us, or why the wifie turned to the plumber for attention, this chart should help explain it all.)
Among playoff teams, the Cowboys created the fewest turnovers, and that situation has a big impact on Scoreability: even prolific quarterbacks and offenses need gifts from their defense.
And in this respect, the Dallas defense did not uphold its end of the bargain. That's part of the beauty of Scoreability: it's a team-wide measure of success. Stat geeks and number munchers like to measure units in a vacuum. But in reality, individual units do not play in a vacuum. They each lean on each other for success. Scoreability measures that relationship.
The final table shows the percentage of each team's drives that started in opposing territory – most likely due to a turnover or special teams play. As you see, the Dallas offense had to do a lot more work than other teams just to achieve the same results.
| Team |
% of Drives Starting in Opp. Territory |
2009 Playoff Team |
| Green Bay |
17.3% |
X |
| Philadelphia |
16.8% |
X |
| NY Giants |
15.3% |
|
| Chicago |
15.0% |
|
| Baltimore |
14.2% |
X |
| New England |
14.1% |
X |
| Minnesota |
13.9% |
X |
| Denver |
13.8% |
|
| Atlanta |
13.5% |
|
| NY Jets |
13.3% |
X |
| Arizona |
13.2% |
X |
| San Diego |
12.9% |
X |
| Indianapolis |
12.6% |
X |
| Tampa Bay |
12.4% |
|
| San Francisco |
12.2% |
|
| Pittsburgh |
11.5% |
|
| New Orleans |
11.4% |
X |
| Houston |
11.4% |
|
| Buffalo |
11.2% |
|
| Jacksonville |
10.9% |
|
| St. Louis |
10.6% |
|
| Kansas City |
10.4% |
|
| Cincinnati |
10.2% |
X |
| Cleveland |
10.1% |
|
| Carolina |
9.9% |
|
| Miami |
9.9% |
|
| Washington |
9.3% |
|
| Dallas |
8.9% |
X |
| Tennessee |
8.6% |
|
| Oakland |
8.4% |
|
| Detroit |
8.3% |
|
| Seattle |
8.3% |
|
Once again, Dallas performed poorly. Despite a lofty defensive rating (No. 2 last year in scoring defense), the Cowboys offense started fewer drives in opposing territory than any playoff team. In fact, only Tennessee and three of the league's very worst teams trailed Dallas in this indicator.
This lack of assistance from the defense means that Romo and the Cowboys offense had to earn just about every point they scored.
Green Bay, on the other hand, finished seventh in scoring defense. But its offense began more than 17 percent of drives in opposing territory (compared with less than 9 percent for the Cowboys).
If we assume that teams average about 10 possessions per game, the Packers started in opposing territory about twice per game; the Cowboys just once. That's a huge difference over the course of a season.
The lack of turnovers may have been a fluke. Turnovers often are fluky, at least fumbles. Regardless, if the Cowboys really want to make a run at being the first team to host a Super Bowl, they need to improve their efficiency all across the field: the defense and special teams need to give Romo and the offense an occasional short field. And Romo and the offense need to do a better job turning its red zone opportunities into points.
Otherwise, Dallas will face another doomsday collapse here in 2010.
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